

# Behind the news: 1

Lawrence Wilde

## The Politics of Transition: The Swedish Case

**T**he defeat of the Swedish Social Democratic Party (SAP) in the general election of September 1991 places in jeopardy the social-democratic framework of Swedish society which has operated with considerable success for over half a century. During the only previous occasion in the past 55 years in which a bourgeois coalition assumed governmental power, from 1976 to 1982, that framework was left untouched. This time there will be considerable pressure to break with tradition. Although Conservative Prime Minister Carl Bildt presides over a shaky four party 'bourgeois bloc' which does not command a parliamentary majority, the electoral support for the SAP (37.6 per cent) was the lowest since 1928.

Yet little over a decade ago a number of writers argued that the Swedish 'model' of welfare capitalism provided a sound basis for the development of fully-fledged socialism. In particular they emphasised the significance of wage earner funds in gradually transferring the ownership of the means of production to the workers. In support of this argument Walter Korpi's

*The Working Class Under Welfare Capitalism* (1978) and *The Democratic Class Struggle* (1983) contained detailed empirical research on the organisation and attitudes of the Swedish working class, and several large-scale empirical studies were also cited in *Beyond Welfare Capitalism* (1981) by Ulf Himmelstrand, Goran Arhne, Leif Lundberg and Lars Lundberg. The transitional potential of Sweden was also enthusiastically espoused in *The Transition From Capitalism to Socialism* (1979) by the American socialist John Stephens. To raise the question of

transition from capitalism to socialism seems fanciful in 1992, after a decade of the implementation of new right ideas and the collapse of the command economies in the Soviet Union and Eastern Europe. In this paper I will look at the story of the wage earner funds in order to throw light on a number of questions. Why were the theorists of transition so confident in the late 1970s? How did capital respond to the perceived threat? Why did social democracy retreat in the face of this response? Is it possible to retain a theory of 'transition' in a meaningful way in 1992?

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TO A WAVERER

*You tell us  
It looks bad for our cause.  
The darkness gets deeper. The powers get less.  
Now, after we worked for so many years  
We are in a more difficult position than at the start.  
But the enemy stands there, stronger than ever before.  
His powers appear to have grown. He has taken on an aspect of invincibility.  
We however have made mistakes; there is no denying it.  
Our numbers are dwindling.  
Our slogans are in disarray. The enemy has twisted  
Part of our words beyond recognition.*

*What is now false of what we said:  
Some or all?  
Whom do we still count on? Are we just left over, thrown out  
Of the living stream? Shall we remain behind  
Understanding no one and understood by none?*

*Have we got to be lucky?  
This you ask. Expect  
No other answer than your own.*

(Bertolt Brecht, 1935)

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*We want the world and we want it now.*

(Jim Morrison)

## The Swedish Model

The SAP first entered government in 1932 after winning over 40 per cent of the vote, and from that time until 1991 it was absent from government only for one three-month period in 1936 and for the six years of the bourgeois coalition from 1976 to 1982. The strength of popular support, the high level of unionisation and party membership, and the fragmentation of the right-wing parties helped to mould a society committed to the welfare of all its citizens and the prosperity of its industries, seeing the goals of efficiency and equality as complementary rather than contradictory (Milner, 1989). The 'corporatist' consensus did not involve nationalisation of the means of production, but it did produce high levels of taxation and welfare expenditure. The economic strategy on which the success story of the 1960s and 1970s was based was advocated by two labour economists, Gosta Rehn and Rudolf Meidner. Profits were to be squeezed by high wage settlements gained through collective bargaining, and the likelihood of high inflation was to be averted by high indirect taxes to dampen down demand and finance a high level of social provision. 'Solidaristic bargaining' would ensure that all workers received commensurate increases, which would put small or relatively inefficient firms under great pressure. In order to combat the potential increase in unemployment an 'active labour-market policy' was adopted, including re-training programmes and other attempts to increase mobility of labour, as well as job creation schemes (Lindbeck, 1975, ch.3; Hamilton, 1989, part 3).

The strategy was highly effective in social and economic terms, helping to create a prosperous, egalitarian, and peaceful society. It provided for what appeared to be the best possible welfare

provision, high standards of education and training, and it encouraged the most efficient sectors of Swedish industry to innovate and expand. Of course it was greatly helped by the long post-war boom, and the high level of welfare provision was greatly helped by the low level of defence expenditure compared with most of its economic rivals. But it was strong enough to cushion Sweden from the worst effects of the international crisis which set in after 1974, and the strength of the consensus embodied in this strategy was underlined by its continuation through the period of right-wing government from 1976 to 1982. Indeed this government reaffirmed the state's responsibility for employment protection by nationalising more industries than all of its SAP predecessors (Pontusson, 1984, p.84). However, the 'model' was weakened in the mid 1980s by the considerable dilution of centralised wage bargaining, and by 1990 Sweden faced serious economic problems.

Although the system was judged favourably by many right-wing social democrats in other parts of Europe, by the mid-1960s some Swedish socialists began to contemplate more radical developments. Two related issues were confronted concerning power in the productive process. The first was the manual workers' trade union federation's (LO) perception of 'excessive' profits among the richest companies caused by the self-limiting wage increases accepted as part of the solidaristic bargaining system. The second was the lack of power exercised by the workers in decision-making at enterprise level. The general thrust towards greater power for organised labour was manifested in the adoption of a new industrial policy by the SAP in 1967, instituting a state investment bank, an industrial ministry, regional and sectoral planning, a state holding company, and state representatives on the boards of large corporations. An

element of worker participation was introduced in 1971 when it was decided that there would be two workers representatives on the the boards of companies employing over 100 workers. In 1974 there was an end to the employers' absolute right to hire and fire labour without consultation, something that had been accepted under the 1938 agreement. In 1976 the Co-Determination Act required management to initiate negotiations with unions on any proposed changes (Elder, 1988, pp.157-8; Hamilton, 1989, ch.10).

### Wage Earner Funds

The great issue which provided the battleground between right and left in Sweden surrounded the 'wage earner funds' proposals, first put forward by Rudolf Meidner within the LO in 1975 and adopted as official LO policy the following year (Himmelstrand, 1981, ch.19; Korpi, 1983, pp.233-6). When the proposal was finally put before the SAP for adoption in 1978 it declared that firms with more than 500 employees would be obliged to issue shares every year to wage earner funds, the shares representing 20 per cent of their profits. The funds, set up on a regional basis, would appoint shareholders representatives (from the unions and local labour representative bodies) to the boards of enterprises. It was estimated that with average profits of 15 per cent it would take 25 years for labour to achieve over 50 per cent of the voting rights in a company (Himmelstrand, 1981, p.266). The response from business and the parties of the right was predictably hostile, for this measure posed a direct threat to the existing relations of production (for a full discussion see Svenson, 1989). However, many within the SAP were afraid that the proposal would break the consensus which had hitherto been beneficial to the

working class, and they blamed this new radicalism for the election defeat of 1976. Korpi maintained that the SAP's insistence on maintaining their nuclear energy programme was the main reason for the defeat (Korpi, 1978, pp.330-1), but there can be no doubt that the opposition was galvanised by the funds issue, and that they were able to count on the vociferous support of the majority of the press (Korpi, 1983, p.219). The 1978 Conference of the SAP decided to defer the matter for consideration by the 1981 Conference, at which the original idea was considerably diluted. Although the SAP returned to power under Olaf Palme in 1982, there was still staunch opposition to the funds, and the forces of the right organised protest marches in 1983 (the October 4th Movement).

The 1983 law set up five regional employee investment funds, financed by a payroll tax and a 20 per cent profits tax on larger firms (Milner, 1989, p.135). Each fund was authorised to own no more than 8 per cent of a firm's shares, but as five funds were created it was possible for the collective workers to obtain an important stake in some enterprises. However, the funds ceased to receive profit shares from 1990, relieving the long term threat to the ownership of Swedish capital. The enactment of the legislation in 1984 triggered the suspension of centralised bargaining, for the employers federation, the SAF, refused to cooperate with the government, despite the attempts by Prime Minister Olaf Palme to persuade them that the workers required some incentive to secure their moderation (Walters, 1987, p.70). The weakening of centralised bargaining, hitherto dominated by the LO and the SAF, had in fact already begun with the decision of the employers in metal (cars and engineering) to insist on separate bargaining in 1983 (Lash, 1985). However, a return to less rigid central bargaining

occurred in 1985 (Rehn and Viklund, 1990, p.318), and in that year Renewal Funds were set up which increased union power. The funds comprised of 10 per cent of profits exceeding a certain level, but they remained in the Central Bank without earning interest until unions and management agreed on how they would be used in training and research and development (Rehn and Viklund, 1990, pp.309-10).

In seeking to move away from corporatist arrangements and to reduce the level of taxation (and with it social expenditure), the greatest threat of powerful employers is to move out of the country altogether, and this places a tremendous constraint on the ability of a social-democratic government to maintain corporatist arrangements. The head of Volvo, Pehr Gyllenhammar, has argued for decentralised bargaining since the early 1980s. Volvo accounts for 12 per cent of Sweden's exports and employs 6 per cent of the country's manufacturing workforce (Milner, 1989, p.145). Saab, the 'other' motor manufacturer, is now owned by General Motors. Rehn and Viklund have argued that the big exporters in Sweden such as Volvo, Electrolux, Ericson, and SKF, can 'almost blackmail' government at central and local level, and also operate more independently from the SAF (Rehn and Viklund, 1990, p.321). One of the ways in which they have supplemented national agreements is by introducing profit-sharing schemes. With business pressure to retain competitiveness in the world system, the SAP government was forced to preside over a significant decrease in public expenditure as a percentage of gross national product, from 67 per cent in 1982 to approximately 50 per cent in 1991. The recent period has been particularly difficult for the Social-Democrats. Although they retained political power in the elections of 1985

under Palme and 1988 under his successor Ingvar Carlsson, the level of support dropped on each occasion as the economy became more difficult to manage. Partially as a result of the dilution of the solidaristic bargaining system industrial unrest grew and inflation increased to 7 per cent by 1990. Growth remained at less than 2 per cent per annum throughout the 1980s, and austerity measures were introduced in January and October 1990. These included cuts in welfare provision, public sector job losses and the privatisation of electricity and telecommunications (Vulliamy, 1990; *Socialist*, 17 November 1990). At the SAP Congress in September 1990 it was agreed that there would be no progress on decommissioning nuclear power stations, even though a referendum decision of 1980 commits Sweden to phase them out by 2010 (*Socialist Affairs*, 4, 1990, p.68). Sweden's share of the world market declined, and here again the compelling logic of the world market imposed its shadow on events. Her competitors have been able to limit or cut public expenditure in a number of fields, and in future may reap a 'peace dividend' from the end of the cold war proportionately greater than that of Sweden. Sweden remains tied to high levels of public expenditure, and 40 per cent of the work force are employed in the public sector compared with less than 25 per cent in the EC (Vulliamy, 1990). Sweden was committed to negotiating a 'European Economic Area' between the EC and the European Free Trade Association (EFTA) of which Sweden is a member, but the process of seeking integration into the new Europe was advanced in December 1990 when a parliamentary vote gave Carlsson a mandate to apply for EC membership (*Socialist Affairs* 4, 1990, p.68). This application was lodged on July 1, 1991.

As for the wage earner funds, the pre-election proposals by the SAP government

was for the five funds to be merged with five general pension funds, the five new funds to be allowed to hold a combined 25 per cent of votes in a listed firm. The proposals were due to be enacted from January 1993. The opposition parties immediately denounced the new funds proposal as a threat to the private ownership of industry (Reuters, 15 March, 1991). The employers' association (SAF) has proposed a five-year plan which comprises the complete cornucopia of new right delights. The familiar canon of Thatcherism forms its agenda—privatisation, marketisation of health care and child-care, privatisation of insurance and pensions, sale of council houses, introduction of education vouchers, and, of course, abolition of the wage earner funds (*Financial Times*, November 8, 1990).

### Transition to Socialism?

Having looked at the practice of social democratic corporatism and some of its recent problems, let us consider more closely the arguments which suggested that the 'left corporatist' model could act as a stepping stone to the achievement of socialism. These arguments should be seen in the context of the collapse of the post-war boom and the need to offer a left alternative to the Keynesian measures which had helped to sustain it. Similar 'left turns' were witnessed in Britain (the Labour Party's 1973 Programme), and in France (the common programme of the PS and PCF).

Korpi reasoned that the immense strength of the organised working class in Sweden had tilted the balance between capital and labour decisively in favour of the latter. In adopting the practice of solidaristic wage bargaining the Swedish labour movement focused power at the

centre (the LO and also the TCO—the white collar workers' federation) rather than with individual unions (Korpi, 1978, p.231). The strong links with the Social-Democrats, and the willingness of members to vote for the SAP and to join it in large numbers had produced a situation in which labour was well positioned to win the 'democratic class struggle'. The wage-earner funds debate was a major battle in the broader struggle. The demands were founded on the labour view that excess profits were being made partly as a result of the solidaristic bargaining process. The funds proposals maintained the principle of solidarity, extended real powers to the collective worker, and implied a foreseeable qualitative change in the ownership of the means of production (Korpi, 1978, ch.11; Korpi, 1983, pp.232-6). Korpi was aware that this would put the unions in a difficult dual role as representatives of the employees and owners of the firms, and he recognised that the unions' own democratic structures would come under careful scrutiny. Furthermore, he advocated universal and equal suffrage in the elections to the boards administering the funds, thereby giving a voice to the unwaged (Korpi, 1983, pp.234-5). At the time Korpi wrote his two books it was not clear which way the SAP would move on the funds. Korpi recognised that the party faced a choice of historical significance, and he called on the SAP to formulate a 'provisional utopia' and demonstrate a way of moving towards its attainment.

In reasserting a form of gradualist Marxism, Korpi explicitly rejected both Leninist and corporatist interpretations of the role of organised labour. Leninism rejected parliamentarianism as an effective means of change, while corporatism minimised the significance of political competition, emphasising agreements between the 'big' actors in all major

decision-making (Korpi, 1983, p.4). In Korpi's view, decisive struggles were fought out politically, but a 'key part' of these struggles was generated by 'conflicts of interest in the sphere of production' (Korpi, 1983, p.208). In view of the significance given to the political struggle, it is not surprising that both Korpi and Himmelstrand *et al.* analysed the reasons for the 1976 defeat of the SAP. The message which they conveyed, supported by an abundance of survey findings, suggested that a more left-wing stance would have found a receptive audience. Like Korpi, Himmelstrand rejected the idea that Social Democracy had forged a permanent integration of the working class into capitalism (Himmelstrand, 1981, pp.23-4), and he followed the view that the Swedish working class had engaged in a number of stages of development which had opened up the possibility of a transition to socialism (Himmelstrand, 1981, chs.21, 22). The situation in the late 1970s and early 1980s posed critical problems for the SAP, for the end of the post-war boom exposed the contradiction between the increasingly social character of productive forces and the private character of the relations of production, and this was bound to limit the possibility of compromise between class interests. The strategy to push for economic democracy as the 'next stage' was closer to Marx's thinking than was the Leninist model, according to Himmelstrand (p.309), and the danger that it would place excessive power in the hands of union technocrats had to be countered by the widespread democratisation of all elements of society (p.207 & pp.312-5).

Stephens was also impressed with the level and strength of organised labour in Sweden and the consequent potential for the transition to socialism. He distinguished between the welfare statism which was common to most advanced capitalist

countries after the Second World War, and 'production politics', which relocated the question of the ownership and control of the means of production to the centre of political debate, as it did in Sweden in the late 1970s. He described three conditions for the development of production politics; first, ruling without petty bourgeois coalitions, second, a high level of white-collar unionisation, and third, a long period of government by the socialists (Stephens, 1979, pp.197-8). Sweden was the only country which came close to achieving all three conditions. The wage earner funds provided a more subtle and effective method of transition than nationalisation:

The brilliance of the policy is that it not only results in socialisation of the economy with no financial layout from the government, but also provides for new sources of capital formation, which is likely to be a serious problem in all capitalist countries when and if the current recession is over. Thus the policy is a practical solution to an immediate problem. (Stephens, 1979, p.205)

However, in citing Olaf Palme as saying in 1979 that the funds were 'inevitable', Stephens clearly underestimated the pressures which the Palme leadership faced in a political culture based on compromise rather than confrontation, continuity rather than 'breaks'.

### What went wrong?

The Swedish 'transition' theorists have been criticised on a number of counts. We can identify three major, interrelated elements which enable us to understand why the hopes of the theorists in question

have been stilled—the international context, the conception of class power, and the role of the state. There was hardly any consideration of the effects of the internationalisation of the economy on Sweden, and therefore little estimation of the likely effects on the class struggle of changes in the accumulation process in response to the downturn in growth experienced since 1974 (Pontusson, 1984). This national focus was perhaps more understandable in Sweden than in Britain, given the strength of Swedish social democracy, but with the advantage of hindsight it is the greatest weakness of the writers in question. However much the state intervenes to maintain investment with schemes such as the wage earner funds and the renewal funds, the ultimate power to invest rests with management, and the possibility of shifting operations to countries with lower taxation and more flexible bargaining arrangement placed an enormous constraint on the SAP government.

The second element turns on the conception of class power. The writers used high levels of unionisation and party membership as an indication that the working class was actively class conscious, and Korpi and Himmelstrand provided survey findings to support this. They tended to underestimate the tendencies which weaken class homogeneity (Pierson, 1986, pp.122-3). From the outset the idea of the wage earner funds was associated with the major manual workers' federation, the LO, and was premised on the strength of labour and the SAP in the corporatist compromise. In the 1980s the strength of the LO fell in comparison with the white collar unions (Lash, 1985, pp.224-8), and certain sectors of the LO became very hostile to public sector workers who were regarded as living off the productive workers and holding back their just rewards (see Svenson, 1991).

The verdict of Rehn and Viklund is damning:

The unions in private industry—mainly the Metalworkers' Union—from having been the leaders of social reform inside the labour movement now appear as more self-centred and 'red-necked'. They play no role in the uphill fight for equal opportunity between the sexes, which many consider the most important issue on the labour market: they have come to accept employer proposals for higher wage differentials; and they have joined the liberal criticism of the public sector, using a rather tough language against their fellow workers. (Rehn and Viklund, 1990, p.324)

While such divisions may have been difficult to anticipate a decade ago, it was then not hard to see that support for the Left had not increased with the size of the working class. After achieving over 50 per cent of the vote in the 1968 elections the SAP lost support in three successive elections, and although the share of the vote showed a small revival during the period of the bourgeois coalition, it further declined in 1985 and 1988, when the Greens entered Parliament with 5.5 per cent of the vote and the Left Party Communists retained a 5 per cent share. In 1991 the Left Party polled 4.5 per cent, but the combined vote of the socialist bloc was only 42.1 per cent and the Greens (3.4 per cent), failed to secure representation. In order for an important initiative like the wage earner funds proposals to command popular support it was essential to link them to a wider democratic movement, particularly in the areas of the environment and the position of women in society. Both Korpi and Himmelstrand recognised the danger of placing too much power in the hands of

the labour bureaucracy, but they did not anticipate the extent to which such 'labour power' was vulnerable to the ideological onslaught of neo-liberalism.

Finally, there is the question of the role of the state. Pontusson has argued that the state was limited in its capacity to nationalise private property by the terms of the Swedish model (Pontusson, 1984, p.87). In that sense the historical compromise stemming from 1938 contained an important obstacle to effecting a transition to socialism. This is a very different situation to the one confronting the 1974-79 Labour Government in Britain, where there is plenty of evidence of hostility from the state apparatus. In Sweden the state apparatus was thoroughly permeated by the SAP, but it was also thoroughly tied to a corporatist model which many considered to be under threat from the wage earner fund proposals. In the reality of inter-state competition the Swedish state comes under great pressure to provide the conditions most favourable to Swedish capital accumulation, and by 1990 it appeared that this was no longer compatible with the level of welfare and education support which had been a feature of the old model. Even when the state apparatus is not obviously sympathetic to conservative forces, it is obliged to act in the interests of those who control the levers of economic power; as Offe has commented, this is the 'institutional self-interest of the state' (Offe, 1984, p.120).

### The end of the national road

Have we seen the end of 'social-democracy in one country' in the same way that we have seen the demise of 'actually existing socialism in one zone'? And if the inglorious end to the dictatorships of Eastern Europe signals the end of 'Marxism-Leninism' as a doctrine, does the Swedish experience mark the end of

'Marxism-Kautskyism'? Do socialists have to concur with a pessimistic economic determinism in which there is 'no escape from the laws of world economics' (Frank, 1990)? Certainly one lesson of the recent past ought to be a respect for the power of the capitalist world-economy and the limitations it places on 'national roads' to socialism. This theme has been elaborated in recent articles in *Capital & Class* 42 (1991) by Lambert, Picciotto, and McMichael and Myhre, and is now a common theme in *European Labour Forum*, published for the Socialist Group in the European Parliament. Korpi's 'general hypothesis', namely, that 'the presence of reformist socialist parties in the government can bring public policies closer to wage-earner interests' (Korpi, 1983, p.25), is undoubtedly correct, but this has little to do with the idea of a transition to socialism. The experiences of France and Spain in the 1980s offer further evidence of the difficulty of establishing a national road to socialism. This leaves the possibility of attempting to revive the idea of transition on a European scale, as further political integration is advocated by most of the social-democratic parties in the EC.

However, we have to acknowledge that in political and economic terms the internationalisation of labour lags well behind the internationalisation of capital. A good example is the respective responses to the 'Vredeling directive' of 1982 which emanated from the European Commission and which offered workers in multinational firms the right to information on future policies which affected them. The proposals were rendered harmless after the most intensive lobbying from American and European business (Lambert, 1991, p.16; De Vos, 1990). The Social Charter and the Action Programme emanating from it are both circumspect on the issue of workers' information and participation,

and although the European Parliament has been more forthright in its demands for information and participation guarantees, there is nothing approaching the radical nature of wage-earner funds (McMahon, 1991; Hughes, 1991). Gosta Rehn wrote a report on wage earner funds for the European Commission, recommending them as an alternative to the use of high unemployment as a tool of economic management (Milner, 1989, p.135), but clearly such ideas are not even close to making the agenda for the regulation of industrial relations in the new Europe. Nor do the statements from leading European social-democrats such as Delors, Fabius, Kinnock, Vogel and Gonzales offer more than the wish to standardise rights already enjoyed in most member states (Dankert and Kooyman, 1989).

There is now a growing recognition among socialists that political and economic action for workers' rights has to be developed on an international scale, and that such action must sensibly direct its activities at the level of the EC. Dennis MacShane has outlined a number of areas for labour movement activity in Europe for the 1990s, paying particular attention to the struggle for a shorter working year and on environmental protection (MacShane, 1990). Lambert has pointed out that a number of 'new politics' parties in Europe already frame their programmes in terms of the need for European-wide policies (Lambert, 1991). Picciotto has called for the 'building of a new internationalism which can combine the strengths of class politics and popular social movements' (Picciotto, 1991, p.59) Within social-democracy, there has been a call for a European-wide Socialist Party by Ken Coates, the Nottingham MEP (Coates, 1990; 1991), which has drawn stern opposition from Neil Kinnock on the grounds that such a party would be premature. The new leader of the German

Social Democrats, Bjorn Engholm, has commented that 'at every party Congress in Europe we talk about global interdependencies in terms of the economy, the environment and other issues, yet our social-democratic parties are organised in a classically national manner'. He also notes how 'ludicrous' it is that the European Parliament has less power than did the Reichstag before the First World War (Engholm, 1991, p.8). Achille Occhetto, leader of the Italian Party of the Democratic Left, has urged the development of socialist politics for the new 'European nation' and believes it will 'capture the imagination of the young' (*The Guardian*, January 25, 1990). Eric Heffer indicated a rethink on the traditionally anti-European British Left when he wrote that he was convinced 'that a point has been reached where socialism must be rescued from its imprisonment within national boundaries' (*The Guardian*, November 4, 1990).

Politically, this implies nothing less than a reversal of the trend of the past 120 years, since the disintegration of the First International and the rise of socialist/labour parties based in and sucked into the arena of the nation state. It is also clear that 'economic' demands have to be widened to encompass the priorities of the new social movements (see Gorz, 1989, part 3 & Appendix), in a coalition of forces seeking widespread democratisation of all areas of life, eventually leading to a new, much more radical, Social Charter mark two. The Swedish experience appears to confirm Marx's observation in *On the Jewish Question* that 'politics has become the serf of financial power' (Marx and Engels, 1975, p.171). Both Marx and Engels pointed out that what they termed 'communism' was possible only on an international scale (Marx and Engels, 1975, p.53; Marx and Engels, 1976, p.352), although the squirming footnotes

of the editors of the Marx-Engels *Collected Works* try to suggest that they did not really mean what they said. Socialist movements of various sorts have come to power in nation-states and all of them have had to contend with the hostile power

of the world economy. But if Europe becomes the world economic hegemony of the 21st Century, the exercise of political power will perhaps be less vulnerable than in the old nation states.

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