Race, Multiculturalism, and Labour Organizing in the United States: Lessons for Europe

Boy Lüthje and Christoph Scherrer

THE NEO-LIBERAL ASSAULT on labour unions, the introduction of new schemes of capitalist work organization, and the expansion of low-wage manufacturing and service industries, have probably been nowhere more pervasive than in the United States of America. Massive immigration, the subsequent ethnic re-composition of the working class, and the emergence of new patterns of racial discrimination and segmentation are forming an essential part of what business pundits and mainstream economist like to call the 'new U.S. economy'. During the recent two decades, however, the U.S.A. has also witnessed important struggles of non-white immigrant workers for social organization and political representation, which have hardly become known in Europe. Furthermore, the open bankruptcy of the Cold War AFL-CIO leadership allowed the rise of labour leaders more committed to the organization of non-white immigrant workers.

As the U.S. is re-emerging as a global model for economic restructuring, these developments entail many lessons for the labour movement in Europe. A serious assessment of the implications of the growth of a new, increasingly non-white working class for the reconstruction of trade unions and the labour movement as a political force requires a closer look at the relationship between the changing patterns of racial segmentation in the workforce, the historically established forms of trade unionism, and the changing conditions of the capitalist economy. As any such comparison between the U.S. and Europe, this discussion should neither view global economic restructuring as a U.S.-enforced implementation of neo-liberal principles into the more 'civilized' parts of the

capitalist world, nor should it reinvoke the idea of an 'Americanization' of the labour movement. Such projections are simplistic; they tend to credit Western European capitalism and the social-democratic welfare state as the lesser evil over American-style Neo-Liberalism. With regard to race, we would end up ignoring the racial cleavages within 'welfare capitalism' and within the working class in Western European countries.

The following discussion of race, multiculturalism, and labour organizing in the United States, therefore, is based on the assumption that the dominant styles of labour union politics on both sides of the Atlantic have been mostly similar despite different legal, political, and cultural contexts. This is true at least for the 'social partnership'-oriented labour organizations in Germany and Northern Europe, to a lesser degree also for the historically more militant trade union traditions in Southern Europe as well as in Britain. American business unionism and European labour corporatism rest on the assumption of a common interest between workers and employers in bureaucratically governed, stable labour relations and the need for strict adherence to labour law. Both have basically reproduced the hierarchy among workers in the labour market. Business unionism has openly focused on maximizing the market power of its members with little regard for workers outside its jurisdiction or with less marketable skills (Herding and Sabel, 1979). While corporatist unionism has been more inclusive, its leadership ranks have been predominantly recruited from the most privileged strata of workers. These leaders negotiated corporatist arrangements that privileged indigenous, white, male, skilled workers. In times of industrial restructuring and increasing unemployment these bargains were frequently struck to the detriment of women, less skilled workers and immigrants (Esser, 1982).

Among the lessons to be learned, we consider three of greatest importance. First, the failure of unions to build bridges to ethnic minority and immigrant workers leads to a dwindling membership base, to political isolation, and to declining bargaining power. Second, ultimately the struggle against the discrimination of ethnic minorities and/or immigrants in the labour market cannot be overcome within the limited framework of union struggles. Third, any organizing effort of workers of colour will entail struggles for a broader representation of these minorities inside the union.

Our discussion will start with an evaluation of some central conceptions of current debates on race, ethnic identity, and multiculturalism and their meaning for labour organizing. We will then retrace the structural dimensions of racial and workplace domination under the labour regime established in the 1930s and 1940s, including a more detailed discussion of the political economy of racial exclusion practised by post-war labour unions. Before this background, we will discuss the crisis of the post-war system of industrial relations, the new organizing experiences of immigrant and minority workers in the 1990s, and the related aspects of current policies of renewal in U.S. labour unions. We hope to show that overcoming racial and ethnic divisions will remain a fundamental political yardstick against which the real changes in the labour movement will have to be measured—a lesson not only of importance for the United States but for most European countries as well.

Racism, Immigration, and Multicultural Solidarity

One of the more common conceptions of the progressive discourse on race, ethnicity, and labour organizing on both sides of the Atlantic seems to be the notion of multiculturalism. In Europe, it grew out of the anti-racist activities of immigrant support groups like *SOS racisme* in France or the solidarity with political refugees from the NATO-backed military dictatorship in Turkey in the early 1980s. Ideologically, the concept was championed by theorists of the emerging green-alternative parties like former Frankfurt city councilman Daniel Cohn-Bendit in Germany and subsequently transformed into a general synonym for ethnic diversity and liberal immigration policies, acceptable to most Social-democrats as well as the more liberal representatives of established right-wing and Christian-democratic parties.

In the United States, multiculturalism refers to a similar awareness of the growing ethnic diversity of the working population. Other than in Europe, however, multiculturalism also reflects the historical experiences of more than a hundred years of struggle of the black population as well as Hispanic and Asian minorities against the system of white supremacy. From the 1950s to the 1970s, the civil rights movements had put the issue of race discrimination on the public agenda. Since the 1980s, debates among progressives have increasingly embraced

the concept of multiculturalism. This shift in discourse reflects the increased weight of new immigrants from Latin America and Asia among the so-called minorities and the social stratification within minority groups. The passage of the Civil Rights Act in 1964 and the introduction of federal policies of affirmative action helped remove barriers to the American middle class for a considerable number of blacks but fell short of improving the economic lot of the majority of blacks. The consequence has been mounting social disparities in the black population.

In the 1980s, the idea of a progressive, multicultural alliance took the shape of Jesse Jackson's Rainbow Coalition (Henry, 1991). While the Rainbow disappointed any hopes for changing American society through alternative electoral politics, it has been an important force in the opposition to attacks on the welfare state. It thereby established multi-ethnic organizing as a core principle of all progressive political movements and coalitions. Concepts of multicultural solidarity also find a positive resonance in unions. *Multiracial organizing* is explicitly seen as the practical next step for the labour movement.

To sift through multiculturalism in all its complexities, ambiguities, and commercial subtexts would exceed the scope of this article (see Ostendorf, 1995). Within the context of the labour movement, multicultural solidarity may be understood primarily as the practice of solidarity among all those who have to rely on wage labour (including those involuntarily excluded from the workforce) who, at the same time, recognize and value cultural differences. This concept differs from shallow conservative universalism on the one hand and racial-identity politics on the other. Advocates of universalist class-based strategies claim to be 'colour-blind'. Considering that they view social equality as a near actuality, they are indeed blind to existing practices of exclusion based on skin colour and other features of distinction. Universalists command solidarity for objectives that are almost exclusively dictated by a dominant group; they then expect members of non-dominant groups to fall in line and put their own ideas and needs second, including calls for affirmative action (Kelley, 1997).

Racial-identity politics, on the other hand, is acutely 'colour-sensitive.' Its advocates take physical, even genetic differences and diverse cultural traditions and derive from these group-specific, immutable characteristics that are ostensibly common and of critical importance to all group members. Racial-identity

politics recognize solidarity only within group boundaries (invariably defined by self-proclaimed spokespersons). At best, it aspires to peaceful coexistence with other groups (see Marable, 1994). Racial-identity politics find an economic basis in the so-called enclave economies of racial or ethnic minorities, for instance the Latin-American or Asian immigrants in large urban agglomerations like Miami or Los Angeles (see Grenier, 1997; Wong, 1997) or the black-business projects fostered by crusaders for black nationalism like Louis Farrakhan. Even subsidies to minority-owned businesses, an important part of affirmative action policies, facilitate exploitative mechanisms by which the appeal to solidarity within an ethnic group (for example, black workers in black businesses) disguises existing conflicts of interests within the group (see Davis, 1997).

In a discussion of universalism and racial-identity politics, it must be stressed that categories such as race or ethnicity (and class, as well) did not originate in nature but in society. They exist only in conjunction with concrete social power relationships, and hence may be changed and overcome by society. Racism, as Balibar astutely observed, is 'a societal relationship' (Balibar and Wallerstein, 1990: 54). This throws light upon an important insight in recent sociological literature in the USA, which holds that racism is not to be understood and criticized solely as the discrimination against minorities of different skin colour. Rather, one must challenge the basic socio-cultural assumptions of the ruling (read white) racism, which in the US have been coined *whiteness* (Roediger, 1993 and 1994; Saxton, 1990; Crenshaw, 1995). Whiteness refers to the notion, anchored in manifold social, cultural and ideological practices, that Anglo-American/Northern European 'whites' are culturally different (and superior) to 'blacks,' 'reds,' 'browns,' and 'yellows.' This master-race identity, which the diverse groups of European immigrants since the 19th century have repeatedly adopted as a unifying element in the oppression of non-white minorities, is the most consistent ideological-cultural feature of political hegemony in U.S. society (Marable, 1994).

In deciphering the concept of *whiteness* one should not be tempted to assume that non-whites, drawing on their collective experiences of racist oppression, will come together to form a cultural, social and political front against white-run hegemony. In the US, racism and xenophobia are not equivalent. Discrimination against immigrant groups like the Chinese in the

19th century or the Latinos today may take on heavy racist overtones, but the history of the black community and its discrimination differ from that of non-white immigrant groups. This is partly due to the different legal status of blacks and immigrant groups; the former as US citizens in the post-bellum era, the latter as legally or illegally residing aliens. The absence of shared identity has revealed itself in the often aggressive attempts of white and non-white new immigrants to improve their lot at the expense of blacks, especially on the job and in labour unions. This competition was only overcome, and then only partially, through political struggles in the 1930s and 1960s (see Goldfield, 1993 and Hill, 1968) which unified an agenda of social transformation with one of economic equality.

Historical Legacies

As in Europe, many American intellectuals, who prefer class politics to multicultural organizing, show a surprising nostalgia for the 'welfare state' of the post-War era. They contend that the welfare state was built around universalistic principles, that it treated everyone the same. Consequently, they charge the racial-identity politics of Afro-Americans, other ethnic groups and women with complicity in the dismantling of the welfare state. Through their narrow-minded pursuit of self-interest these groups are said to have contributed to the dissolution of the New Deal coalition, whose constituents supported President Franklin D. Roosevelt's reform policies in the 1930s and formed the basis for the expansion of the welfare state under the Democratic administrations of Kennedy and Johnson (see Harvey, 1994).

The New Deal coalition was anything but an alliance of equals. Born of historical coincidences, the coalition's existence was due not least to the tactical expertise of Roosevelt, who wooed voters from members of extremely disparate and antagonistic groups. The Democratic Party of the New Deal and post-War periods was truly one of the strangest parties in the world. Its supporters included the quasi-feudal elite of the defeated Southern states, the outsiders to the business world in the North (especially Irish people and Jews), the Democratic party machines of big industrial cities of the North and East, and blacks, who earlier had supported 'Lincoln's Party,' the Republicans. The formal tie of this multi-racial and multi-class

coalition was the two-party system; materially the coalition was reinforced by awarding public commissions for municipal infrastructure, military installations, and irrigation projects and by subsidizing agriculture (Domhoff, 1990: 235–45).

For the majority of blacks, the New Deal at first meant further impoverishment. Its policies financed the mechanization of cotton production, which in turn drove black plantation workers and tenant farmers out of rural areas. A similar fate befell Mexican and Mexican-American farm labourers in California, who were displaced by westward-migrating white farmers from Oklahoma and Texas left destitute by the Depression (see Majka and Majka, 1997). The war economy and the economic boom of the post-War era initially led to a surge in demand for factory workers, but by the end of the 1950s, as the USA was heralded by economists like J.K. Galbraith as the 'affluent society' (1958), almost a full one third of society did not participate in this wealth (powerfully documented in Michael Harrington's 1962 book *The Other America*). Furthermore, the faction of the New Deal coalition most heavily represented in Congress, the so-called Dixiecrats or Democrats from the South, refused to grant blacks equal civil rights, educational and career opportunities. Even the unions, the coalition partner which was most vocally in support of formal equality for blacks and which agitated for the integration of Southern and Eastern European immigrants, was only somewhat universalistic in practice, as has been amply demonstrated by Herbert Hill (1989), Michael Goldfield (1993) and others. As a matter of fact, racially oppressed workers in non-manufacturing industries like agriculture remained excluded from labour rights granted by the National Labour Relations Act (Duster, 1996).

Up and into the 1930s, the vast majority of U.S. unions excluded black and other non-white workers more or less directly. With the exception of the United Mineworkers of America (UMWA), only unions that took part in this practice were able to become firmly established. Neither the Knights of Labour (1869-1886), which operated with little heed to origin, skin-colour and social position, nor the syndicalist and radically anti-capitalistic Industrial Workers of the World (IWW; 1902-1917) managed to lay solid institutional foundations. Solely the Congress of Industrial Organization (CIO), founded in the 1930s, successfully balanced—at least to some extent—a non-exclusionary organizing policy with its institutional needs. Unlike their predecessors in the American Federation of Labor

(AFL) at the turn of the century, the CIO unions did not have to cope with mass immigration. The borders of the USA had been closed for two decades when the large strike movements began in the 1930s, reaching its climax in the famous sit-down strikes in the automobile industry (Asher and Stephenson, 1990). The rank and file constituents of the CIO unions had immigrated from Eastern and Southern Europe before World War I.

In the wake of the McCarthy era in the 1950s and the unions' policy of accommodation to the agenda of economic growth and the Cold War, the gulf between rhetoric and action widened in the CIO unions as well. However, the capitulation in the conflict over shop-floor control and the abandonment of the struggle against racial discrimination did not happen without internal struggles in major labour unions. As Mike Goldfield (1997a, b), Robin Kelley (1990), and others have shown, racial practices in most places were overcome more easily where there existed political forces and tendencies that supported multiracial organizing. In the 1930s and 1940s these were mostly the shop-floor and union organizations of the socialist, communist, and trotskyist left (Keeran, 1980; Schatz, 1983). As the war-time alliance between the U.S. and the Soviet Union unravelled, most of these groups, the communists in particular, were driven out of the unions. The political purges of organized labour in the McCarthy era paved the way for the exclusion of large industrial unions under left-wing leadership like the United Electrical Workers (UE), the International Longshoremen and Warehouse Union (ILWU), the Mine Mill and Smelter Workers, and others from the CIO. Thus, exactly those unions were excluded from labour's mainstream who practised a relatively equal representation of non-white workers in their bargaining units and thereby could have served as models for the organization of the non-union states of the South and Southwest (Rosswurm, 1992; Wellman, 1995; Goldfield, 1997a,b).

The Post-War Social Contract

The enduring discrimination of non-white minorities in post-war U.S. capitalism has been incorporated into the 'fordist class-compromise' (Aglietta, 1979; Davis, 1986) which ended the period of militant labour struggles of the 1930s and 1940s (Lichtenstein, 1978). As is well known, the social contract negotiated between major industrial unions and corporations under the leadership of

the automobile industry between 1946 and 1950 was based, to an important extent, on the unions' final renunciation to challenge management control over the labour process. As part of the deal, unions became accepted as bargaining partners (Davis, 1986). While unions were able to obtain substantial gains in wages and benefits during the post-war period of economic prosperity, the acceptance of the status quo in shop-floor power relationships reinforced those structures that were built on the discrimination of black and other non-white workers (Hill, 1968, 1988, 1989). To be sure, strong union control over working conditions on the shop-floor alone would not have automatically ended discrimination at the workplace. The de-facto suppression of autonomous union organizations in the plants, however, essentially limited the options and capacities of large industrial unions to wage fundamental reforms in labour policies to end discrimination on the shop-floor (Lichtenstein, 1995).

In many instances, the basic protections unions had won against employer despotism on the shop-floor by the widespread acceptance of contractually sanctioned seniority systems (Montgomery, 1979) cemented the hierarchies between different groups of workers. As the length of employment became the regulating principle of company-internal labour markets, all those employees were disadvantaged who had been hired the last. Above all, this applied to blacks and women who had not become part of the industrial workforce in larger numbers until World-War II. During lay-offs, they usually were the first who had to leave. The discriminating effects of seniority systems were even more pronounced where seniority was not determined on a plant-wide base but, as in most cases, at the level of individual departments. For blacks employed in the dirtiest and most dangerous jobs this meant that they were not able to change into departments with more attractive working conditions, even if they had long-time job tenure (Hill, 1989; Wolkinson, 1973).

As a consequence, the pattern of racial segmentation, characterizing the structure of U.S. post-war labour markets became increasingly solidified. As frequently described (for example, Gordon *et al.*, 1982), the situation of workers in unionized core corporations like General Motors, US Steel, or AT&T with relatively stable employment and substantial fringe benefits starkly contrasted with those in the less-well paid jobs in non-union establishments in the South, in many smaller industries, and in services. Whereas higher skilled industrial work

continued to be a domain of white males, blacks disproportionally occupied the lower skilled industrial workplaces and the less desirable jobs in secondary labour markets. With the exception of agriculture, employment of non-white immigrants from Latin America and Asia did not play a significant role in this period.

Under these conditions, the black civil rights movement of the 1950s and 1960s became the moving force of social reform in U.S. society (Davis, 1986; Marable, 1995). After passage of the Civil Rights Act in 1964, it took massive pressure from without and within for the industrial unions to acknowledge discrimination against their own members and to introduce measures to surmount them (see Hill, 1997, 1998, Goldfield, 1997). Most union leaderships were so devoted to the maintenance of the racial and social status quo at the workplace and in society in general, that they were afraid (not without reason) that any substantial reform of the system of workplace regulation would weaken their existing co-operative relationships with employers and a U.S. Congress dominated by Southern Dixiecrats (Foner, 1982). Thus, the struggle for racial equality at the workplace in many instances assumed the form of a struggle of black against white. At the same time, even government-initiated reform policies to broaden the U.S. welfare state, as President Johnson's Great Society Program, remained without roots in the political system of U.S. capitalism (Lichtenstein, 1995).

Unions, Discrimination, and Labour Market Segmentation

The backsliding of the CIO unions into a position of tolerance and even active participation in exclusionary practices against blacks raises the question of structural constraints that foster divisions among workers. To better understand the options open to unions, we will briefly look at how the labour market structures the interests of its participants in furthering discriminatory behaviour. When many workers compete for relatively few jobs, low wages are likely to result. On the one hand management is, therefore, not interested in the exclusion of whole groups of people from the labour market (or from particular sectors of the labour market). Efforts to lower the skill-content of jobs (Taylorism) and the readiness of some businesses to hire workers from groups not traditionally part of their labour pool (for example, 'illegal' immigrants) give testimony to an interest in enlarging the supply

of labour. On the other hand, the wage relation is not just about exchange of labour power, but also about power between capital and labour. To prevent workers from taking a unified stance against management, the latter tries to split its workers into groups and to play them off against one another. In the USA, management has regularly perpetuated existing group identities or forced them into being (for example, white collar employees). For unskilled positions, workers of different nationality have been grouped together to heighten competition among them. Conversely, skilled labour has been customarily reserved for particular ethnic groups and compensated with higher wages (see Omi and Winant, 1986 and Gordons *et al.*, 1982).

For many businesses, structuring internal labour markets along the lines of skin-colour, nationality and gender is less a conscious strategy than an adaptation to prevailing social customs. If a business were to breach the written and unwritten rules of behaviour, it would conceivably have to reckon with protests from many sides: from privileged labour groups (for example, strikes of white workers objecting to the employment of blacks), from customers, from other companies and even from government organizations (Honey, 1993). Even without negative sanctions, a deviation from the status quo in filling qualified positions would translate into higher costs at least in the short term, because additional training costs would be incurred for workers who had not profited from parental example. Workers on their part also turn group affiliation into a motive for exclusion, informed not necessarily from rational calculations but from the practices and notions manifest in the everyday racism of society.

For unions, the chief motive for representing only specific groups of workers is to bolster union negotiating power, which necessitates solidarity among workers and a limited labour pool. In the confrontations with management, individual workers must be prepared to sacrifice personal gain for the betterment of the entire workforce. Whereas on the job this can mean observing fixed working hours, workers involved in labour struggles are known to pay a heavy price, especially during organizing drives. Since the wage relation has its roots in strictly vertically and horizontally structured societies, the labour movement got started under conditions where an understanding of solidarity and sacrifice-making was usually restricted to persons of the same social rank and a common ethnic/religious background. Conditions favourable to the development of a class

consciousness shared by many workers existed in places where workers had more in common than simply their position in the labour market—especially if these commonalties distinguished them from other social groups. At the same time, the immigration of persons outside of these social ties had to remain low so as not to disrupt the status quo. Both conditions were more or less met during the founding years of unions in most European countries, more so than in the USA. In countries such as Germany, the exclusion of workers from the political system prior to 1918 promoted the strong allegiance of large segments of the workforce to socialist parties (Tenfelde, 1987).

In countries where such political conditions did not exist—in the USA for instance—unions were much more dependent on strategies to exclude certain groups from the labour market to stabilise the price of labour. Discriminating against groups that were already stigmatized in society (for example, foreigners and former slaves) or whose right to work was less recognized by society (such as children and women) was a relatively easy method to keep organizing costs low. The expenditures for organizing sectoral labour markets could be held even lower because workers who were excluded from these markets had other work possibilities open to them. A sectoral labour market could generally be monopolized if the members of one group possessed skills that were relatively scarce in the labour market and had developed ties of solidarity that were stronger compared to those of other groups. Therein lay the key to success of ethnic unions in the skilled trades, like Greek locals in the fur industry (see Asher and Stephenson, 1990).

We do not wish to devalue other explanations for racist behaviour among workers, for example the longing for a collective identity (see Autrata *et al.*, 1989). The difficulty involved in keeping the supply of labour scarce, however, may explain the structural reason why unions, despite professions to the contrary, practice exclusion. Once a labour movement has embraced the principle of exclusion, in each new decision-making situation labour leaders are likely to assess the costs and risks of becoming more inclusive to be higher than the maintenance of exclusionary policies. This holds true especially if the decisions are informed by bureaucratic procedures and calculations. With an eye to union coffers, organizing poorly paid workers in poultry processing facilities in a right-to-work state surely appears less worthwhile than organizing workers

with relatively secure jobs in the public sector (see Black Workers for Justice, 1992).

In the long term, however, such short-term cost-avoidance strategies will not pay off. The membership will shrink in numbers for three reasons: first, growing wage differentials between unionized and unorganized sectors will increase the incentive for management to avoid union representation of their workforce. In hiring for new plant locations or in introducing new production methods, management will invariably try to hire workers from groups who were previously excluded from the labour market. Second, these new groups will remember their earlier experiences as victims of discrimination and will be less open to organizing efforts by established unions. Third, unions that traditionally practised exclusion will hardly find among their ranks the persons who would be capable of approaching and organizing the new workers.

An absolute or even relative decline in membership must not yet spell the demise of union power. In time, however, the growing isolation of unions in the labour market will make them susceptible to political attacks from management, which will aim at restricting the unions' legal rights and political power. Management will be all the more successful the less unions find political allies. These will be in short supply, if a union has a history of discriminatory behaviour. If management succeeds in curbing labour's rights, the unions will see their powers diminished even in those segments of the labour market which they hitherto controlled.

The history of the U.S. labour movement offers innumerable examples for the long-term consequences of exclusionary practices. The craft unions lost their strong position in the labour market in the wake of Taylorism and Fordism. As a consequence of their inability to form alliances, it became possible to isolate them politically (Montgomery, 1987). Because the CIO overcame their exclusionary practices, it succeeded in organizing industrial workers. But in the early 1950s, for reasons that Goldfield has elaborated (1995), the CIO unions gave up on their agenda to organize all industrial workers. The aborted attack on the bastions of racist exclusion in the South left a bitter legacy. Powerful Southern politicians doggedly chipped away at the political influence of unions within the Democratic party. After abandoning Operation Dixie, the campaign begun in the early 1950s to organize the South, unions were no longer able to

organize any new group of workers, with the exception of public sector workers (Davis, 1986: 92).

In their pursuit of expaning the 'company welfare state' (pension, health insurance, unemployment assistance) for their members, unions lost incentives to fight for the extension of federal benefits, which would have raised the social welfare of all workers. In addition, the late 1960s witnessed the growing alienation of the labour movement from the progressive forces of American society. The self-inflicted isolation of the union bureaucracy led to momentous defeat in the 1970s: in 1978, the AFL-CIO failed in its bid to reform the National Labour Relations Act, which would have halted the steadily declining legal position of unions. Despite the fact that the Democratic Party possessed a majority of seats in both houses of Congress and President Carter personally supported the reform, the unions, with no strong allies among consumer, civil rights, women's and environmental movements, were not up to the challenge of the massive management lobbies (see Davis, 1986: 97–107).

Beyond the Social Contract

As union representation in the U.S. has shrunk to 15% of the eligible workforce, blacks and other ethnic minorities were among the most affected by the crisis of the fordist mode of accumulation. Especially in the earlier stages of corporate downsizing in the seventies and mid-eighties, employment reductions and plant closures overwhelmingly affected those jobs that were typically held by women and ethnic minorities, particularly lower-skilled positions in manufacturing. The seniority system in most labour contracts aggravated this, as ethnic minorities had typically been trapped in the lower ranks of job hierarchies with the most limited options for continued employment or re-assignment during lay-offs. In the traditional centres of large-scale manufacturing industries like Detroit, Pittsburgh, or Los Angeles the elimination of industrial jobs was a prime cause for the unemployment of blacks and other non-whites. Together with the racially motivated move of mostly white middle-classes into suburbs, de-industrialization was at the root of the economic and social devastation of many U.S. inner cities (Davis, 1990; Sassen, 1991; in our context: Davis, 1997; Olney, 1997; Phillips, 1997).

At the same time, immigration from Mexico, Central America, and Asia increased dramatically. The average net growth of the immigrant population in the U.S. has been 750.000 per year throughout the 1980s and 1990s (Bacon, 1994). A large proportion of the immigrant population does not have valid visa and work permits and is thereby regarded as illegal. Currently, the U.S. Immigration and Naturalization Service (INS) estimates the number of 'illegals' at 4 million. In addition, there are almost a million of mostly Mexican farm workers who entered the country without proper documentation during the 1970s and received legal status through the *Immigration Reform and Control Act* (IRCA) of 1986. This stream continued almost uninterruptedly, although police control of the borders was permanently reinforced under the growing pressure of anti-immigrant organizations.

The anti-immigrant backlash of the last decade also has deep roots in the crisis of the post-war social contract. As the established political, social, and workplace protections for the core working class were eroded, the self-inflicted isolation of traditional business unions against the political movements and organizations of blacks and other non-white minorities decisively precluded the formation of any broader social opposition against the economic restructuring enforced under the regime of Reagonomics in the 1980s. Particularly the better-off parts of the white working-class threatened by job reductions cancelled their long-time electoral support for the Democrats and defected to the camp of the Reagan revolution. Racist and anti-immigrant campaigns against the achievements of the civil rights movements like affirmative action proved especially appealing to them. Together with the upwardly mobile middle classes in old and new economic growth areas, in California in particular, and the traditional racist white milieus of the old South, this group formed a substantial part of the electoral mass-base of the so-called Reagan coalition of the 1980s (Davis, 1986, for a fresh reappraisal see Phillips, 1997). From the traditional New-Deal-coalition, only the black population remained as a solid and mostly reform-oriented electoral group, which also was the backbone of the only significant project for alternative reform policies inside the Democratic Party; Jesse Jackson's rainbow-coalition in the presidential primaries of 1984 and 1988.

The decline of traditional industrial sectors and changed production methods have engendered new patterns of discrimination in the labour market. In the age of lean production,

immigrants, white and non-white temporary workers, and black low-wage workers increasingly occupy the lower tiers of the supplier pyramids of manufacturing industries. Today, most of this part of the manufacturing infrastructure is based in the South and Southwest, where also the new basic industries of advanced capitalism, semiconductor and electronics manufacturing, have their core complexes (Moody, 1997a, 1997b). In some industries with mostly non-union operations, electronics in particular, new industrial core workforces have emerged which are mostly made up of immigrants or non-whites. Here, the white male skilled worker of fordist mass-production has been largely replaced by immigrants with some skills, many of them of Asian origin and some of them women (Eisenscher, 1993; Bacon, 1997a; Lüthje, 1998; for an appraisal of the temporary workers' situation in electronics see Benner, 1996).

The rapid advancement of immigrants into the industrial workforce of vertically disintegrated and downsized manufacturing, which in the U.S. has been more pronounced than probably anywhere else in the developed capitalist world, has by no means ended racial and gender discrimination. The proportion of women earning less than the legal minimum wage, for instance, has been growing fastest among black and *Latina* women. Subcontracting and the unbundling of capitalist mass production into networks of smaller plants in suburban or rural areas has further reinforced the concentration of non-white minorities in unstable and poorly paid jobs. In this context, immigrants from Latin America and Asia are subject to a two-pronged type of discrimination: in addition to their racially defined status as non-whites, the restrictions of their residential status by U.S. immigration policies and the legal jungle of group specific immigration regulations for various nationalities and professions are a *sui generis* cause of insecurity and status differentiation, producing a permanent threat of illegalization to large portions of the immigrant workforce (Hollens, 1993).

Furthermore, in some industries and companies workers of specific nationalities are heavily concentrated. They sometimes may regard the respective labour markets as a domain of their own. On the other hand, employers tend to reinforce the divisions of the workforce by preferentially employing specific immigrant groups. This is particularly true for the growing enclave economies of immigrant-owned sweatshops in cities like New York, Los Angeles, or Miami (Grenier, 1997, Ong *et*

al., 1994), but also for the new citadels of globalized high-tech mass production like California's Silicon Valley (Park, 1992). Here, ethnic entrepreneurs (as they are called in the U.S. today) of various nationalities command workforces overwhelmingly made up of their own nationality or ethnicity, playing on existing social dependencies in immigrant communities, and establishing sometimes extremely exploitative forms of company paternalism (Lüthje, 1998). This problem has become visible only in exceptional instances (like the strike of Chinese restaurant workers in New York's Chinese-owned Silver Palace establishment; Levin, 1997) and labour sociologists so far have not developed much in-depth knowledge about it. It seems evident, however, that the emerging forms of decentralized and lean production in services and manufacturing by no means produce a new, homogeneous low-wage working class, which some European observers in the tradition of workers' autonomy and *operaismo* would see as the potential subject of a new form of revolutionary class organization (Roth, 1994). Race and ethnicity as a factor of class division as well as a potential for organizing may probably nowhere be more complex than inside the immigrant communities in the 'post-fordist' production complexes in the developed capitalist world (see: Grenier, 1997; Wong, 1997; Davis, 1997; Olney, 1997; Bacon, 1997a).

Organizing the Immigrants

Some unions and activists took up the challenge of organizing the new labour force. About 10 years ago, the Service Employees International Union (SEIU) was one of the first unions to try to organize those who have been considered unorganizable in the U.S. as well as in Europe: immigrant low-wage workers in an industry heavily dominated by networks of subcontracting firms. In a large-scale organizing campaign called 'Justice for Janitors', dozens of SEIU locals fought successfully for labour contracts and other social protections in one of the typical growth industries of today's service economy, the building service and maintenance industry in big cities like Los Angeles, Houston, or the San Francisco/San Jose area. It thereby organized thousands of mostly Latino low wage workers. The clout of Justice for Janitors was derived from a community-based strategy. This approach made scores of activists of local immigrant groups part

of the organizing effort. Given the lack of reliable bargaining partners in the industry, the activity of the union membership was not solely directed against single local firms, but against the big contractors dominating the industry and enforcing low-wage competition among subcontractors. It thereby ignored the limitations of the organizing procedures enshrined in existing labour laws. Not only did Justice for Janitors demonstrate the potential of community-based mobilization to break the vicious circle of low-wage competition of immigrant workers in subcontracting firms, but also that civil disobedience can be a successful organizing technique (Bennett, 1997; Bacon, 1997a).

Other struggles, like in the drywall construction industry or in automobile parts supply companies in Los Angeles revealed the organizing power deriving from the political experiences of immigrants with a long-time record of resistance against social exploitation and military rule in their home countries (Olney, 1997). In their current campaign to unionize California's strawberry industry, unions with militant organizing traditions like the United Electrical Workers, the Farm Labour Organizing Committee (FLOC) in Ohio (Majka and Majka, 1997), or the United Farm Workers are developing cross-border-organizing strategies designed to extend union activities among immigrant workers on both sides of the Mexican-U.S. border. For organizing Latino workers in a number of mid-sized metal parts factories in the once heavily unionized mid-western city of Milwaukee, the United Electrical Workers brought in an activist from its Mexican sister organization *Frente Auténtico de Trabajo,* FAT. He played a crucial role in mobilizing the initially fearful Mexican immigrant workers in the plants (Davis, 1997).

Unions and activists engaged in these struggles have in common that they care little about the immigration status of the workers. A union contract with decent wages and benefits is the unifying goal for all workers, be they 'legal', 'illegal', or subject to group-specific immigration regulations. Bargaining mobilization alone, of course, cannot counter the repressive impact of immigration laws and law enforcement agencies on the most vulnerable strata of the workforce such as women workers in metropolitan garment sweatshops or migrant workers with temporary work permits in agriculture. These groups of workers, however, have developed new forms of social organization in matters such as legal help, family support, or campaign organization. The New York-based Latino Workers

Center, the Asian Immigrant Women Advocates (AIWA) in Oakland, California, the Black Workers for Justice in North Carolina and others are developing a common identity as Workers Center, referring to their mostly workplace-centred organizing activities in immigrant communities (Levin, 1997; BWFJ, 1997). Their work is based on the idea that the social organization of immigrant workers is a complex process of political activity and learning which needs to be built even in industries where unions are largely absent or where workers of colour are ignored. The phrase: 'organizing, not just unionizing' (Levin, 1997) probably most aptly describes the political aspirations of Workers Center activism as well as the sometimes complicated relationships with existing labour unions.

The AFL-CIO: A 'New Voice' for Workers of Colour

In the fall of 1995, the Cold War leadership of the union federation AFL-CIO was replaced by union leaders such as John Sweeney, the president of the Service Employees International Union, who had supported some of the new organizing efforts in their own unions. The new AFL-CIO leadership around President Sweeney, Vice-President Linda Chavez Thompson, and secretary treasurer Richard Trumka promised a more militant stance in collective bargaining and a more forceful participation in local and national politics. It declared organizing new members in non-union industries as labour's Number One strategic goal. The federation therefore expanded the organizing budget from $2.8 million to about $20 million per year and initiated numerous activities to recruit and train a new generation of organizers, like the much heralded 'union summer' of 1996 around working class communities and campus colleges (Moberg, 1996). Most importantly perhaps, organizing policies became explicitly focused on the large numbers of immigrant workers in low-wage manufacturing and service industries.

Although many of these new initiatives reflect the strategies proposed and practised for many years by dissenting rank and file unionists, a sober look at the enormous dimensions of the proclaimed tasks should temper any high-flying expectations. Seasoned labour organizers have repeatedly criticized the top-down approach prevalent in the new organizing strategies of the federation and of individual unions (Bacon, 1997a; Olney, 1997;

Bennett, 1997; Moody, 1997a; Eisenscher, 1998). In a historic perspective, the U.S. labour movement faces problems similar to earlier periods of industrial transformation. As in the 1930s, organizing today's non-union mass production industries is a question of survival for the unions, requiring long-term strategies, vast resources, and politically experienced organizers inside the respective industries. In particular, the last point may turn out to be an Achilles heel of the new strategy. As in earlier periods, the revival of labour unions as a social movement implies a major effort of long-term political self-education, giving priority to the struggle against racial and ethnic discrimination on the shop-floor and within the unions.

In contrast to the 1930s, however, today's economic and political conditions make a revival of the U.S. labour movement along the lines of the industrial union movements less likely. First, production has become spatially decentralized. In the Detroit of the 1930s, for example, mostly female low-wage workers from Poland, Lithuania, or Russia, making up the majority of the workforce of the part suppliers of General Motors, Ford, or Chrysler, could be organized in the wake of the successful struggles of the mostly white male workforce of the core automobile plants with their organizers predominantly recruited from the ranks of the most skilled crafts workers of Anglo-Saxon, German, or Scandinavian origins (Lichtenstein, 1995: 97-103). The weakening of the bargaining positions of the industrial core workforce and the geographic and organizational dispersal of modern mass production industries have become serious impediments for such a dynamic of social organization. Second, today's unions lack the political allies in the upper middle-classes and certain business groups, they enjoyed in Roosevelt's New Deal-coalition (Davis, 1986). Third, the U.S. economy is internationalized to such a high-degree that the regulation of transnational labour migration in the framework of the nation-state has become almost impossible (Hinojósa and Schey, 1995).

The continuing predominance of old-guard business unionism in many unions decisively limits the scope of intra-union reforms. In some cases, important financial resources and support from the AFL-CIO remain blocked because of top-level resistance in some important international unions against dedicated rank and file organizing strategies. A particularly negative example for this may be the fate of the Los Angeles Manufacturing Action Project (LAMAP; Olney, 1997). This

multi-union alliance, made up of ten important local unions in L.A. including Teamsters, Carpenters, and Autoworkers, aimed at organizing the large number of immigrant low-wage workers in the city's manufacturing industries. LAMAP developed a distinctively community-oriented organizing approach, based on a long-term involvement of local immigrant organizations, churches, and other institutions in the field. Drawing upon the experiences of recent militant struggles of unorganized immigrant workers in local industries as janitorial services, construction, and automobile parts manufacturing, LAMAP activists sought to anchor organizing activities in the social and political structures of recent immigrant groups, especially from Mexico and other Latin American countries. After initial successes, including support for a victorious struggle of 150 Mexican tortilla delivery drivers for union recognition and higher wages, the level of activities could not be sustained. Depending heavily on the moral and financial support from the reformed leadership of the International Brotherhood of Teamsters, LAMAP got caught in the struggle in the Teamsters union between the supporters of the reform leadership of former union president Ron Carey and the old guard under Jimmy Hoffa Jr. The fight between reformers and conservative apparatchiks finally deprived the project of its major source of material support and forced it out of existence.

From a more fundamental perspective, the broader political strategy of the AFL-CIO leadership faces an important dilemma: on the one hand, it is designed to win back former core constituencies of the Democratic Party, i.e. the mostly white working and lower middle-class who have been lost to the Republicans since the Reagan years. On the other hand, these whites have been most susceptible to the racist and anti-immigrant rhetoric of the Republican right, including the heavily protectionist propaganda of right-wing politicians like Perot or Buchanan. While some core groups of the traditional fordist working-class—like in many European countries—are to a certain extent still able to defend their economic interests, they are among the most likely to cast their vote for right-wing political protest groups (Moody, 1997b: 172). Labour leaders often take the electoral importance of these traditional working-class groups as an excuse for being soft on racist and nationalistic wedge issues like immigration, affirmative action, or welfare. It also legitimizes their electoral support for the Democratic Party although the current Democratic administration as well as many Democratic

senators have given only lukewarm support for labour issues or even oppose them. This well-known lesser evil-strategy became very visible during the welfare reform battles of 1996. The AFL-CIO failed to mobilize against the welfare reform bill although it contained a number of openly anti-immigrant measures adopted from the Republican Proposition 187 in California. Most unions had opposed Proposition 187 a year earlier (for an appraisal of this struggle see Hoyos and Grant, 1997; Phillips, 1997).

The debate over immigration policies displays similar contradictions, which long-time labour organizer David Bacon recently summarized as follows:

> Under its old leadership, the AFL-CIO supported employer sanctions during the debate over the 1986 *Immigration Reform and Control Act*. But the direction of movement in the AFL-CIO is away from this position, toward defending the undocumented against rising anti-immigrant hysteria. During the 1996 debate over immigration reform in Congress, the federation urged 'effective control of illegal immigration', including an additional 700 Border Patrol agents. It objected to most of the bill's provisions, however including the national ID card, unrestricted immigration raids in the fields, asylum restrictions, and the disqualification of legal immigrants from public benefits. The position of the AFL-CIO seems caught in the transition from the policies of its old leaders, to those which might be expected from its new ones. (Bacon, 1997b).

Recent developments in the labour movement have taken this transition one important step further. On the initiative of the Central Labor Council of Alameda County in California, the AFL-CIO convention in Los Angeles in the fall of 1999 inaugurated a debate on the basic questions of immigration policy. In the course of the last months, discussions within major unions lead to a reversal of traditional positions on immigration, which may be called historic. In February 2000 the federation´s executive council voted to call for the repeal of sanctions against companies who employ undocumented immigrants, for a new amnesty for the undocumented, and for a broad new program to educate immigrant workers about their rights. The critical stance towards employer sanctions is the most remarkable aspect here, since it reflects the experience long held by rank and file organizers that government controls

of the legal status of workers at most times have proven ineffective in deterring companies from employing undocumented workers. Although a substantial portion of mainstream unions will probably not go along with this shift, the AFL-CIO´s official position on immigration now is based on the principle that organizing immigrant workers into labour unions should be given priority over calling the government for better policing the labour market (Bacon, 2000).

Lessons

For all the peculiarities of the U.S. labour and immigration situation, in today's globalized economy the social and political problems of capitalist restructuring have become much more similar for the labour movements in developed capitalist countries (Moody, 1997b). Again, we are not talking of U.S.-style, neo-liberal anti-union policies becoming the norm in every country, but of the reactions of mainstream unions to the crisis of established forms of bargaining and shop-floor relations. As the basic political and institutional protections for unions in Europe are being eroded, some labour unions turn towards more or less exclusionist behaviour against immigrant workers. In the construction industry in Germany, for example, the post-war wage standards are rapidly undermined by the widespread use of Eastern and Southern European low-wage workers in subcontracting firms (Wilpert, 1998). Unable to defend the existing system of industry-wide bargaining, despite signs of militancy among the membership, the IG BAU has not much more to offer than calling for increased government protections against 'illegal immigration'. Only a handful of activists, so far, have discussed ways of how foreign construction workers might become part of the struggle to preserve wages and working standards in the industry.

As we could find many examples of such kind from Germany and other Western European countries, the recent developments inside the U.S. labour movement definitely have produced some fundamental lessons for a progressive stance towards today´s questions of immigration, racism, and labour organizing, from which European labour organizations can learn. With regard to trade union strategies and tactics three issues are of particular importance:

1. Mobilization strategies such as the SEIU's Justice for Janitors campaign clearly demonstrate an alternative in dealing with exploitative conditions in industries dominated by subcontracting networks and immigrant labour. Practical experience, however, suggests that such changes would be very difficult to achieve in an environment of well-rooted corporatist bargaining relations. Challenging the status-quo would raise fundamental questions about the incorporation of unions into the institutions of social partnership and the role of unions in capitalist society in general. Paradoxically, the 'unpolitical' heritage of U.S. business unionism and its conception of class relations as pure and simple bargaining" makes the adoption of more militant and self-reliant strategies to some extent easier than in many European countries, where labour leaders are more fearful of losing legitimacy in the political arena and support from their social-democrat allies in parliament.
2. With regard to **labour and immigration laws**, the current change of positions within the AFL-CIO puts the U.S. union movement far ahead of most of its counterparts in Europe. It remains to be seen whether the increasing pressure of immigration on labour markets in core industries like construction, transportation, hotels and restaurants, and an increasing array of manufacturing industries will produce the same pressure that caused even old-style U.S. craft unions to question their position. However, rank and file activists in European countries are in the somewhat unusual position of appraising the policies of U.S. labour unions as a model for their own organizations.
3. The U.S. experience also shows that **active promotion of minority workers** at the workplace remains an important element of any multi-cultural agenda in the labour movement. In continental Europe, 'affirmative action' has yet to be applied to ethnic minorities and immigrants with long-time residency. Although historically most European labour laws and contracts contain fewer discriminatory elements than U.S. collective bargaining agreements (Hill, 1997), employment practices relegating and trapping immigrant workers to the lowest jobs and the existence of all kinds of career 'glass ceilings' are a fact of life. Discrimination is legitimized on the basis that these workers are not citizens. Strategies to overcome discrimination have, therefore,

> focussed on ways to ease access to citizenship. This is a particularly hot issue in Germany, where citizenship is not awarded on the grounds of residency and place-of-birth but according to the concept of the German people as an ethnic and cultural entity (Behrend, 1998).

Neither construction workers in Berlin and Frankfurt nor automobile workers in Detroit who see their jobs and living standards undermined by the forces of capitalist restructuring and internationalization will be able to defend their interests without allies among their supposed competitors in the ranks of foreign low-wage workers, be they migrant workers from Poland or assembly workers in maquiladora-plants on both sides of the U.S.-Mexican border. The attempt to organize ethnically oppressed minority workers along class lines, however, will only be successful if it allows these workers to become a force in their own right. Any organizing effort of workers of colour will entail struggles for a broader representation of these minorities inside unions. Enhancing the power of racially oppressed minorities within the labour movement is an essential part of democracy within unions and the labour movement as a whole (Moody, 1995; Wong, 1997).

Studying the U.S. experience, of course, does not give answers about the conditions for change inside labour organizations in European countries. From the perspective of class organization, problems of immigration, racism and multiculturalism undoubtedly raise fundamental questions on the general role of trade unions as a protagonist for social change. U.S. labour activists as well as many theorists of trade unionism in Europe have identified multicultural organizing as an important aspect of rank and file-based transformation strategies, summarized in the term social movement unionism (Moody, 1988 and 1997a; see also Lichtenstein, 1995; for European versions: Trentin, 1978; REVIER, 1981; Deppe, 1984; Wood *et al.*, 1998). As much as we sympathize with such a perspective, we doubt that unions can be easily transformed into social movements. The history of the civil rights and social liberation movements of blacks and other non-white groups in the U.S. suggests that strategies to overcome racist cleavages within the working-class are a genuinely political project which cannot be expected to be developed by a more militant or class-conscious union leadership alone. As scholars and writers

involved in the African-American community have put it most astutely, multicultural organizing as a political project calls for a fundamental transformation of the predominant structures of economic and political power (Marable, 1997; BWFJ, 1997).

Every multi-racial organizing effort that is based on the organizational autonomy of minority-workers, at one point or another has to walk the fine line between integrationist views of class-solidarity and 'separatist' practices. This problem, again, will not be resolved inside the unions alone. It can only be overcome in the context of a broader political project of social and political transformation. In this sense, however, the past and present experiences of multicultural and multiracial labour organizing in the United States demonstrate clearly that the fight against racism has always been a driving force of the politicization of social struggles. In this perspective, fighting racism definitely is a struggle in its own right in the context of a broader political agenda for social justice. 'Anti-racism', as the black U.S. historian Robin D. Kelley recently observed, 'is not identity politics' and the labour movement 'need not be afraid of race, ethnic or gender based autonomous movements'—provided that activists tackle racism not 'simply as a major stumbling block to union solidarity but central to the reproduction of capitalism and the maintenance of white supremacy' (Kelley, 1998).

Acknowledgements These reflections grew out of a book project with U.S. labour activists and academics, presenting their analysis of historical and current struggles of non-white minority workers in the U.S. for unionization and social and political representation (Lüthje and Scherrer, 1997). We extend our thanks to those who contributed to this project: David Bacon, The Black Workers For Justice, Terry Davis, Mike Goldfield, Guillermo Grenier, Herbert Hill, Lisa Hoyos and John Grant, David Levin, Linda and Theo Majka, Manning Marable, Kim Moody, Peter Olney, Gary Phillips, and Kent Wong. Mike Eisenscher and David Wellman provided helpful comments and suggestions for this article. Many thanks to Jean Pietrowicz and Billy Lamb for improving our English.

References

Aglietta, M. (1979) *A Theory of Capitalist Regulation*. Verso, London.

Alarcón, R. (1994) 'Labor Migration from Mexico and Free Trade: Lessons From a Transnational Community'. Chicano/Latino Policy Project Working Paper No. 1. Institute for the Study of Social Change, Berkeley.

Asher, R. and C. Stephenson (1990) 'American Capitalism, Labor Organization, and the Racial/Ethnic Factor: An Exploration' in R. Asher and C. Stephenson

(eds.) *Labor Divided: Race and Ethnicity in United States Labor Struggles, 1835-1960*. State University of New York Press, Albany, NY: 3–27.

Autrata, O., G. Kaschuba, R. Leiprecht and C. Wolf (eds.)(1989:) *Theorien über Rassismus*. Argument, Hamburg.

Bacon, D. (1994) 'Immigration Debate. Under NAFTA the Movement of Money Won't be Stopped' in *Z-Magazine* Vol. 2, December 1994.

__________(1997a) 'Silicon Valley: Gewerkschaften und Immigranten in der High-Tech-Industrie', in B. Lüthje and C. Scherrer (eds.) *Zwischen Rassismus…*

__________(1997b) 'Unions and the Upsurge of Immigrant Workers' in *LaborNet Information List*, December 3, 1997.

__________(2000) 'The AFL-CIO Calls for a New Immigration Policy' in *Z–Magazine*—Internet Website, February 2000.

Balibar, E. and R. Wallerstein (1990) *Rasse, Klasse, Nation – Ambivalente Identitäten*. Argument, Hamburg.

Behrend, H. (1998)'Germany´s War Against Aliens' in *New Politics*, Vol. VII, No. 1, Summer 1998: 25–32.

Benner, C. (1996) *Shock Absorbers in the Flexible Economy: The Rise of Contingent Employment in the Silicon Valley*, Working Partnerships USA, San Jose, Calif.

Bennett, I.(1997) 'Justice for Janitors–ein Modell? Die Kampagne der Angestelltengewerkschaft SEIU zur Organisierung der Immigrantinnen im Reinigungsgewerbe', in B. Lüthje and C. Scherrer (eds.) *Zwischen Rassismus…*

BWFJ—Black Workers for Justice (1997) 'Organizing the South: Für eine neue Gewerkschaftsstrategie in den Südstaaten' in B. Lüthje and C. Scherrer (eds.) *Zwischen Rassismus…*

__________(1992) *Organizing the South: A Southern Strategy for Labor.* Rocky Mount, NC.

Calva, J. L. (1991) *Probables Efectos de un Tratado de Libre Comercio en el Campo Mexicano*. Distribuciones Fontamara, México, C.F.

Crenshaw, K. (ed.) (1995) *Critical Race Theory – The Key Writings That Shaped the Movement.* New Press, New York.

Davis, M. (1986) *Prisoners of the American Dream. Politics and Economy in the History of the American Working Class.* Verso, London.

__________(1990) *The City of Quartz: Excavating the Future in Los Angeles.* Verso, London.

Davis, T. (1997) 'Global denken, lokal handeln: Gewerkschaftliche Organisierung und internationale Solidarität in Milwaukee' in B. Lüthje and C. Scherrer (eds.) *Zwischen Rassismus…*

Deppe, F. (1984) *Ende oder Zukunft der Arbeiterbewegung? Gewerkschaftspolitik nach der Wende. Eine kritische Bestandsaufnahme.* Pahl-Rugenstein, Köln.

Domhoff, W.G. (1990) *Power Elite and the State*. Aldine de Gruyter, New York.

Duster, T. (1996) 'Individual Fairness, Group Preferences, and the California Strategy'. in *Representations, Special Issue: Race and Representation—Affirmative Action,* No. 55: 15–23.

Eisenscher, M. (1993) 'Gewerkschaftliche Organisierung in der Computerindustrie: Die Erfahrungen des UE Electronics Organizing Committee im Silicon Valley' in B. Lüthje and C. Scherrer (eds.) *Jenseits des Sozialpaktes. Neue Managementstrategien, Gewerkschaften und Arbeitskämpfe in den USA*. Westfälisches Dampfboot, Münster.

__________ (1998) 'Beyond Mobilization: How Labor Can Transform Itself' in *Working USA*, March-April 1998.

Esser, J.(1982) *Gewerkschaften in der Krise*. Suhrkamp, Frankfurt/M.

Foner, P.S. (1982) *Organized Labor and the Black Worker, 1619-1981.* International Publishers, New York.

Galbraith, J.K. (1958) *The Affluent Society*. Houghton Mifflin, Boston, MA.

Goldfield, M. (1993) 'Race and the CIO: the Possibilities for Racial Egalitarianism during the 1930s and 1940s' in *International Labor and Working Class History*. 44 (Fall):1–32.

__________ (1994) 'Race and the CIO: Reply to Critics' in *International Labor and Working Class History*. 46, Fall 1994.

__________ (1995) 'Was There a Golden Age of the CIO? Race, Solidarity, and Union Growth during the 1930s and 1940s' in Glenn Perusek and Kent Worcester (eds.) *Trade Union Politics: American Unions and Economic Change, 1960s-1990s.* Humanities Press, Atlantic Highlands, N.J.: 78-110.

__________ (1997a) 'US-Gewerkschaften zwischen Rassismus und Solidarität' in B. Lüthje and C. Scherrer (eds.) *Zwischen Rassismus…*

__________ (1997b) *The Color of Politics. Race and the Mainspring of American Politics.* The New Press, New York.

__________ (1997c) 'On Reuther: Legends and Lessons' in *Against the Current,* March/April 1997.

Gordon, D. M., R. Edwards and M. Reich (1982) *Segmented Work—Divided Workers*. Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, Ma.

Grenier, G. (1997) 'Kultur und Solidarität: Latinos in der US-Gewerkschaftsbewegung' in B. Lüthje and C. Scherrer (eds.) *Zwischen Rassismus…*

Harvey, D. (1994) 'Klassenbeziehungen, soziale Gerechtigkeit und die Politik der Differenz', in B. Ostendorf (ed.) *Multikulturelle Gesellschaft: Modell Amerika?* München: 205-227.

Henry, Ch. (1991) *Jesse Jackson: The Search for Common Ground.* The Black Scholar Conference, Oakland.

Herding, R. and C.F. Sabel (1979) '"Business Unions" in den USA: Eine Verteidigung gegen ihre falschen Feinde' in Joachim Bergmann (ed.) *Beiträge zur Soziologie der Gewerkschaften*. Campus, Frankfurt/M: 363–85.

Hill, H. (1968) 'The Racial Practices of Organized Labor: The Contemporary Record', in J. Jacobson (ed.) *The Negro and the American Labor Movement*. Anchor, Garden City, N.Y.

__________ (1988) 'Myth-Making as Labor History: Herbert Gutman and the United Mine Workers of America', in *International Journal of Politics, Culture, and Society*, 2.2 (Winter): 132–200.

__________ (1989) 'Black Labor and Affirmative Action: An Historical Perspective' in S. Shulman and W. Darity Jr. (eds.) *The Question of Discrimination*. Wesleyan University Press, Middletown, CT.

___________ (1997) 'Vom Ausschluß der Schwarzen zum Kampf gegen Affirmative Action: Die rassistischen Praktiken amerikanischer Gewerkschaften' in B. Lüthje and C. Scherrer (eds.) *Zwischen Rassismus…*

___________ (1998) 'Lichtenstein´s Fictions: Meany, Reuther, and the 1964 Civil Rights Act' in *New Politics,* Vol. VII, No. 1 (New Series): 82–107.

Hinojósa, R. and P. Schey (1995) 'The Faulty Logic of the Anti-Immigration Rhetoric' in: *NACLA Report on the Americas,* Vol. XXIX, No.3, November/December.

Hinojósa, R. and S. Robinson (eds.) (1993) 'Labor Issues in a North American Free Trade Area' in N. Lustig, B. Bosworth and R. Lawrence (eds.) *Assessing the Impact: North American Free Trade*. Brookings Institution, Washington, D.C.

Hollens, M. (1993) *The African American Worker*. Labor Notes, Detroit.

Honey, M. (1993) *Southern Labor and Black Civil Rights*. University of Illinois Press, Chicago, Ill.

Hoyos, L. and J. Grant (1997) 'Gewerkschaftlicher Widerstand gegen Proposition 187', in B. Lüthje and C. Scherrer (eds.) *Zwischen Rassismus ...*

Husbands, C.T. (1976) 'Editor's Introductory Essay' in W. Sombart edited by C.T. Husbands, *Why Is There No Socialism in the United States?* M.E. Sharpe, White Plains.

Keeran, R. (1980) *The Communist Party and the Auto Workers Union*. Indiana University Press, Bloomington, In.

Kelley, R.D.G. (1990) *The Hammer and the Hoe: Alabama Communists During the Great Depression*. University of North Carolina Press, Chapel Hill, N.C.

___________ (1997) 'Identity Politics & Class Struggle', in *New Politics*, 6(2, New Series): 84-96.

___________ (1998) *Address to Scholars, Artists, and Writers for Social Justice*. SAWSJ Information List: www-document.

Levin, D. (1997) 'Workers Center: Ein neuer Ansatz für die Arbeiterbewegung?' in B. Lüthje and C. Scherrer (eds.) *Zwischen Rassismus…*

Lichtenstein, N. (1978) *Labor's War At Home: The CIO in World War II.* Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, Ma.

___________ (1995) *The Most Dangerous Man in Detroit. Walter Reuther and the Fate of American Labor*. Basic Books, New York.

Lüthje, B., and C. Scherrer (eds.) (1997) *Zwischen Rassismus und Solidarität: Diskriminierung, Einwanderung und Gewerkschaften in den USA,* Westfälisches Dampfboot, Münster.

Lüthje, B. (1998) 'Race and Ethnicity in 'Post-Fordist" Production Networks: Silicon Valley and the Global Information Technology Industry' Paper presented at ASA Annual Convention, Panel on Global Racism, San Francisco, Calif., August 21-25, 1998.

Majka, L.C.T., and T.J. Majka (1997) 'Zwischen Protest und gewerkschaftlicher Organisation: Arbeitskämpfe von Einwanderern in der kalifornischen Landwirtschaft' in B. Lüthje and C. Scherrer (eds.) *Zwischen Rassismus…*

Marable, M. (1994) 'Building Coalitions among Communities of Color: Beyond Racial Identity Politics' in Jennings, J. (ed.) *Blacks, Latinos and Asians in*

Urban America. Status and Prospects for Politics and Activism. Greenwood Press, Westport, CT: 29-43.

__________(1995) *Beyond Black and White*. Verso, London.

Moberg, D.(1996) 'The New Union Label' in *The Nation*, April 1.

Montgomery, D. (1979) *Workers Control in America*. Cambridge University Press, Cambridge/New York.

__________(1987) *The Fall of the House of Labor. The Work Place, the State, and American Labor Activism, 1865-1925.* Cambridge University Press, Cambridge.

Moody, K. (1988) *An Injury to All. The Decline of American Unionism*. Verso, London.

__________(1995) 'Why Women, People of Color Should Have the Right to Organize Separately', in *Labor Notes*, August.

__________(1997a) 'Pulled Apart, Pushed Together—Die US-Arbeiterklasse in der neuen Ökonomie Nordamerikas', in B. Lüthje and C. Scherrer (eds.) *Zwischen Rassismus…*

__________(1997b) *Workers in a Lean World. Unions in the International Economy*. Verso, London.

Olney, P. (1997) 'Arbeitskämpfe und gewerkschaftliche Organisierung in den Sweatshops von Los Angeles', in B. Lüthje and C. Scherrer (eds.) *Zwischen Rassismus…*

Omi, M. and H. Winant (1986), *Racial Formation in the United States.* Routledge, New York.

Ong, P., E. Bonacich and L. Cheng (eds.) (1994) *The New Asian Immigration in Los Angeles and Global Restructuring*. Temple University Press, Philadelphia.

Ostendorf, B. (1995) 'Der Preis des Multikulturalismus: Soziale Gerechtigkeit und die Politik der Differenz in den USA', *in Perspektiven – Internationale* Studentenzeitung, Frankfurt/M.

Park, E. J.-W. (1992) *Asian Americans in the Silicon Valley: Race and Ethnicity in the Postindustrial Economy*. Ph. D. dissertation, University of California Berkeley.

Phillips, G. (1997) 'Kalifornien 1996: Schwarze, Latinos und der Angriff auf Affirmative Action', in B. Lüthje and C. Scherrer (eds.) *Zwischen Rassismus…*

Piore, M. and C. Sabel (1984) *The Second Industrial Divide.* Basic Books, New York.

REVIER (1981) *Brennpunkt Stahlkrise. Ursachen und Lösungsperspektiven*, REVIER-Verlag, Duisburg.

Roediger, D. (1993) *The Wages of Whiteness*. Verso, London.

__________ (1994) *Toward the Abolition of Whiteness*. Verso, London.

Rosswurm, S. (ed.) (1992) *The CIO's Left-Led Unions.* Rutgers University Press, New Brunswick.

Roth, K.-H. (ed.) (1994) *Die Wiederkehr der Proletarität—Die Debatte.* ISP Verlag, Frankfurt/Köln.

Sassen, S. (1988) *The Mobility of Labor and Capital.* Cambridge University Press, New York.

__________(1991) *The Global City. New York, London, Tokyo.* Princeton University Press, Princeton/New York.

Saxton, A. (1990) *The Rise and Fall of the White Republic*. Verso, London.
Schatz, R. (1983) *The Electrical Workers*. University of Chicago Press, Urbana and Chicago.
Slaughter, J. (1997) 'The New AFL-CIO´s First-Year Report Card—Sweeney: Pass, Fail, or Incomplete?' in *Against the Current*, March/April.
Tenfelde, K. (1987) 'Die Entstehung der deutschen Gewerkschaftsbewegung' in U. Borsdorf (ed.) *Geschichte der Deutschen Gewerkschaften*. Bund-Verlag, Köln.
Trentin, B. (1978) *Arbeiterdemokratie*. VSA, Hamburg.
Wellman, D. (1995) *The Union Makes Us Strong. Political Unionism at the San Francisco Waterfront*. Cambridge University Press, Cambridge/New York.
Wilpert, C. (1998) 'Migration and informal work in the new Berlin: new forms of work or new sources of labour?' in *Journal of Ethnic and Migration Studies,* Vol. 24 No. 2: 269–94.
Wolkinson, B.W. (1973) *Blacks, Unions, and the EEOC: A Study of Administrative Futility*. Heath, Lexington, Mass.
Wong, K. (1997) 'Asiatische Immigran tinnen und US-Gewerkschaften', in B. Lüthje and C. Scherrer (eds.) *Zwischen Rassismus…*
Woods, E.M., F. Gapasin, M. Yates, G. Albo and S. Gindin (1998) 'Die Einheit beginnt zu Hause. Über den Zustand der Arbeiterbewegung in den USA', in *Supplement der Zeitschrift Sozialismus,* 2/98: 1-44.